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Judicial Management: 
The Achievements of 
Chief Justice William Howard Taft 
Shortly after William Howard Taft's death in 1931, his successor, 
Charles Evans Hughes, accurately observed that Taft's career 
"fittingly culminated in his work as Chief Justice," because the 
"efficient administration of justice was, after all, the dominant interest 
of his public life" (1). 
This observation suggests an important distinction between 
associate justices and a chief justice. The primary task of associate 
justices is to decide cases and deliver opinions, whereas the work of 
the chief justice also includes administrative responsibilities for the 
judicial branch ofthe federal government. Taft's current obscurity 
strongly indicates that enduring professional reputation depends 
upon the former task, but not the latter. Indeed, when Felix 
Frankfurter praised Taft as a great "law reformer" and accorded him 
"a place in history...next to Oliver Ellsworth, who originally devised 
the judicial system," he unwittingly revealed what a very small place 
that is. It is, however, a very important one (2). 
Chief justices are typically evaluated by how well they employ 
their prerogatives to administer the day-to-day functioning of the 
Court. They are scrutinized for their handling of small emergencies 
and for their ability to dispose efficiendy of routinized institutional 
necessities like assigning opinions or moderating the Court's confer 
ences. Measured by these standards, Taft was a highly successful chief 
justice. He was ruthlessly efficient, moving heaven and earth to force 
the Court to diminish its embarrassingly large backlog of cases. Louis 
D. Brandeis remarked to Felix Frankfurter that Taft, "like the Steel 
Corporation, is attaining [all] time production records" (3). In the 
popular press it was said of Taft that "The spirit of speed and efficiency 
lurking in the corpulent form of an ex-President ofthe United States 
has entered the Court and broken up its old lethargy" (4). 
Within the Court the dominant image of Taft was not that of a 
disciplinarian, but rather of a man who could dispose "of executive 
details...easily" and "get through them without friction" (5). "The 
new Chief Justice makes the work very pleasant," Oliver Wendell 
Holmes said. "He is always good natured and carries things along with 
a smile or a laugh. (It makes a devil of a difference if the C.J.'s 
temperament diminishes friction.) He is very open to suggestions and 
appreciates the labors of others. I rather think the other JJ. are as 
pleased as I am" (6). 
Taft's genial and winning personality was particularly useful in 
managing the Court's potentially contentious conferences. Holmes 
said, "The meetings are perhaps pleasanter than I ever have known 
them?thanks largely to the C.J." (7). The justices also appreciated how 
"fairly" Taft distributed case assignments. Indeed, Harlan Fiske Stone 
later remarked that "there was never a Chief Justice as generous to his 
brethren in the assignment of cases" (8). Most importandy, Taft 
exercised a natural leadership within the Court. 
Supervising the ongoing institutional routines of the Court in 
this manner has been an essential task of every chief justice since John 
Marshall. Like Taft, some chief justices have fulfilled these challenges 
more successfully than others, but all have understood and accepted 
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these obligations of their office. Taft's unique accomplishment, 
however, is that he managed to expand the very concept ofthe chief 
justiceship so that his successors have also been judged by their 
responses to responsibilities not even perceptible before Taft. He 
transformed the role of chief justice by endowing it with a 
distinctive managerial oudook, one that he had acquired as chief 
executive of the nation. 
Yet while Taft may have been, as William Allen White tren 
chandy put it, "innocent of politics" (9), he was always a capable 
administrator, determined to improve the efficient management of 
the executive branch. And it is this perspective that Taft brought with 
him into the chief justiceship. Specifically, Taft viewed the federal 
judiciary as a coherent branch of government to be managed, and he 
viewed the chief justiceship as the source of that management. 
This perspective was fundamentally new, and its implications 
were profound. 
Taft's effectiveness as chief justice and his reworking of that 
position in its relationship to the federal judiciary and to Congress is 
illustrated by the way he secured passage ofthe Act of 14 September 
1922, which, as Felix Frankfurter and James Landis noted, marked 
"the beginning of a new chapter in the administration of the 
federal courts" (10). 
The act not only authorized the chief justice to assign district court 
judges temporarily to sit wherever in the country the needs of the 
docket were greatest, but it also created the Conference of Senior 
Circuit Judges to "advise as to...any matters in respect of which the 
administration of justice in the courts of the United States may be 
improved," and in particular to "make a comprehensive survey ofthe 
condition of business in the courts ofthe United States and prepare 
plans for assignment and transfer of judges to or from circuits or 
districts where the state of the docket or condition of business 




The Taft Court, circa 1923. (Courtesy of the Supreme Court of the United States, Office of the Curator.) 
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"into our judicial system...an executive principle to secure effective 
teamwork," so that "judicial force" could be deployed "economically 
and at the points where most needed" (12). In Taft's view, the 
primary virtue of the act was to empower the chief justice and the 
Conference of Senior Circuit Judges "temporarily to mass the force 
of the judiciary where the arrears are greatest" (13). 
Taft had been advocating a reform like this for years, and there 
was little doubt among contemporaries that the ultimate shape ofthe 
statute, as well as its enactment, were "largely the result" of his "active 
advocacy" (14). Taft lobbied hard for the bill, effectively mobilizing 
his numerous contacts within Congress, and he righdy received the 
lion's share ofthe credit for the results. 
Four aspects of the Act of 14 September 1922 require 
emphasis: 1) the unification ofthe United States judiciary, 2) the 
management of the judicial branch, 3) the establishment of the 
tools needed for this management, and 4) the articulation of the 
judiciary's needs to the legislative branch. Each embodies an 
outlook on the federal judicial branch that reflects the influence 
of Taft's experience as president. 
Unification of the Judiciary 
First, and most fundamentally, the act implied "a functional 
unification ofthe United States judiciary" (15). Just as the executive 
branch has always been seen as an integrated whole, directed by the 
president, the act for the first time conceptualized federal judges as 
also integrated into a single, coherent branch of the federal govern 
ment designed to attain 
functional objectives. Pre 
viously, as Frankfurter ob 
served, "federal judges 
throughout the country 
were 
entirely autono 
mous, little independent 
sovereigns. Every judge 
had his own little princi 
pality. He was the boss 
within his district, and 
his district was his only 
concern" (16). The act, 
in contrast, "organized" 
the "whole judicial 
force...as a unit, with au 
thority to send expeditions 
to spots needing aid" (17). 
This idea may seem 
obvious to us today, but 
in 1921 it provoked great 
resistance. No less a judge 
than Henry D. Clayton 
(after whom the Clayton 
Act was named) attacked 
the act as manifesting "a 
dictatorial power over the courts unrecognized in our jurisprudence" 
(18). Clayton objected to "the war idea of mobilizing judges under a 
supreme commander as soldiers are massed and ordered." He argued 
that 
"judges are not soldiers but servants, and the people only are the 
masters whom they serve" (19). 
To protests like these, Taft responded with the brutal and 
implacable language of instrumental rationality. Although he con 
ceded that "in the judicial work a judge does on the bench, he must 
be independent," Taft insisted that "in the disposition of his time and 
the cases he is to hear, he should be subject to a judicial council that 
makes him a cog in the machine and makes him work with all the 
others to dispose of the business which courts are organized to do" 
(20). The premise that judges are "organized" to accomplish a 
collective function renders the federal judiciary structurally parallel to 
an executive agency, which operates under similar logic. 
Management of the Judicial Branch 
Second, if judges are "cogs in a machine," there must also exist 
some intelligence that directs the machine. Organizations require 
guidance, and the functional unification ofthe judiciary thus implied 
that the judicial branch be subject to "the executive management" of 
"a head charged with the responsibility ofthe use ofthe judicial force 
at places and under conditions where judicial force is needed" (21). In 
this way the act transformed the federal judiciary from an "entirely 
headless and decentralized" (22) institution into one capable of 
"executive supervision" (23). 
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The Taft Court visits the White House, circa 1921 -22. (Courtesy ofthe Library ofCongress, 39567.) 
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Taft defended this transformation as merely a matter of "introduc 
ing into the administration of justice the ordinary business principles 
in successful executive work" (24). He argued that the massive increase 
in federal litigation required that "we must approach the problems of 
its disposition in the same way that the head of a great industrial 
establishment approaches the question of the manufacture of the 
amount that he will need, to meet the demand for the goods which 
he makes" (25). But in fact, the necessity of executive supervision was 
also central to Taft's conception of the president as ultimately 
responsible for the "administrative control" ofthe executive branch. 
In Taft's mind the chief justice, using the Conference of Senior Circuit 
Judges as a kind of cabinet, was responsible for the management of 
the judicial branch, just as the president was responsible for the 
management of the executive branch. 
The managerial obligations that Taft imported into the office of 
chief justice were not exhausted by the operation of the conference. 
Taft enthusiastically embraced a sense of generic responsibility for the 
overall functioning of the federal judiciary. The letters Taft wrote to 
judges who had failed to decide submitted cases for unconscionably 
long periods of time show this responsibility: 
I write in the interest of the administration of justice, and for 
the reputation ofthe Federal Judiciary, that you dispose ofthe 
patent case, which you now must have had at hand and 
submitted to you for more than four years....I write this letter 
with no assumption that I may exercise direct authority over you 
in the discharge of your duties, but as the head ofthe Federal 
Judiciary I feel that I do have the right to appeal to you, in its 
interest and in the interest of the public whom it is created to 
serve, to end this indefensible situation (26). 
To forthrightly accept managerial responsibility in this way is not 
merely to seize the potential of executive supervision, but also to create 
lines of accountability. 
Establishing the Tools of Management 
Third, Taft knew that the management of the judicial branch 
would require the exercise ofthe deeply human virtues of leadership, 
inspiration, and a commitment to what Taft repeatedly called "team 
work, uniformity in action and an interest by all the judges in the work 
of each district" (27). Taft viewed the Conference of Senior Circuit 
Judges as a means for serving these various management functions. 
The conference "is a good thing," said Taft, because it "solidifies the 
Federal Judiciary" and "brings all the district judges within a mild 
disciplinary circle, and makes them feel that they are under real 
observation by the other judges and the country" (28). The conference 
was also a method of gathering information about the federal 
judiciary, of collecting both statistical and narrative data. And the 
conference was a tool for 
"trying to come in touch with the Federal 
Judges of the country, so that we may feel more allegiance to a team 
and do more teamwork." The conference could generate the "esprit" 
that came from close coordination (29). 
Taft freely admitted that 
becoming chief justice 
was "the ambition of my 
life." 
The conference, however, was only one tool for exercising 
executive leadership. In fact, Taft seized the opportunity for such 
leadership in all his dealings with federal judges. He was always "glad 
to keep in touch with the District Judges," because "they are the wheel 
horses of our system, and I want them to know that they have the 
deepest sympathy in their efforts in the dispatch of business" (30). He 
would write to a senior circuit judge requesting "a long gossipy letter 
so that I may acquire intimate knowledge of the situation" (31). 
District judges throughout the nation deeply appreciated this atten 
tion and care, and they wrote to Taft expressing their pleasure. 
Learned Hand, for example, said to Taft that "It is a great comfort to 
know the interest that you take. To be frank, we have never felt it 
before your incumbency" (32). As a good executive, Taft wished "to 
have all the members of the Federal Judiciary realize that we are 
remanded to the top, and that whatever we can do here in Washington 
to help, we will do" (33). 
Articulation of the Judiciary's Needs 
Fourth, as a corollary ofthe functional unification ofthe federal 
judiciary, the judicial branch could now articulate its ongoing and 
routinized requirements to the legislature, just as did the executive 
branch. The conference was the perfect institutional vehicle for this 
articulation, and Taft conceived it as enabling "the judiciary to express 
itself in respect of certain subjects in such a way as to be helpful to 
Congress" (34). Taft rapidly and effectively molded the conference 
into a voice for the institutional needs of the judicial branch. As he 
reported to the conference in 1925: "The recommendations of this 
Conference have a good deal of influence. I mean that they are 
accepted as matters for serious consideration" (35). 
Taft was unwilling, however, to regard the conference as the 
exclusive voice of the judiciary. He believed quite strongly that the 
chief justice was the primary national spokesperson for the cause of 
the administration of justice, and he therefore sought to maintain an 
active personal presence in Congress in matters that transcended the 
pronouncements ofthe conference. In this regard Taft functioned as 
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Oliver Wendell Holmes and William Howard Taft. (Courtesy ofthe Library of Congress, US Z62-17871.) 
an independent lobbyist for a legislative agenda, much as he would 
have as chief executive. 
From the very outset of his chief justiceship, Taft "thought that 
it was part of my duty" as the head ofthe federal judiciary, "to suggest 
needed reforms, and to become rather active in pressing them before" 
Congress (36). Taft was quite aware that this was a new conception 
of his office. "I don't think the former chief justice had so much to 
do in the matter of legislation as I have," he wrote to his brother 
Horace, but "I don't object to it, because I think Chief Justices ought 
to take part in that" (37). 
Throughout his service on the Court, Taft was a frequent witness 
before Congressional committees, lobbying hard for judicial reforms. 
His relendess determination "to keep pressing" Congress for legisla 
tion began almost immediately after he assumed office (38). On 5 
October 1921, he testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 
support of the bill that became the Act of 14 September 1922. He 
realized that he had "violated the precedent in doing this," but he was 
unfazed, because "I am determined to exercise such influence as I have 
to help the judicial system of the country. Precedents that keep the 
judges away from committees who are to help are not precedents that 
appeal to me" (39). By 30 March 1922, in the course of testifying 
before the House Judiciary Committee in favor of bills to enlarge 
the certiorari ju 
risdiction of the 
Supreme Court 
and to reform the 
compensation of 
the Court re 
porter, Taft com 
fort a b 1 y 
remarked, "I 
hate to be in the 
attitude of a con 
tinual beggar 
from Congress, 
but I seem to 
have arrived at 
the court just 
when it was nec 
essary" (40). 
Taft did not 
hesitate to draft 
his colleagues on 
the Court to as 
sist in his lobby 
ing efforts. In 





him to make the 
case before a subcommittee ofthe House Appropriations Commit 
tee for a deficiency appropriation to enable the First Circuit to 
purchase an urgently needed bar library. "I wanted to bring some 
big guns to bear," Taft explained. "I am a constant visitor and I did 
not consider that I had influence enough. This is a real emergency" 
(41). It was said of Taft that the chief justiceship was his "manifest 
destiny" (42). Certainly he freely admitted that the office was "the 
ambition of my life" (43). When Taft finally attained that 
ambition, it was after a long career of executive administration: as 
governor ofthe Philippines, Secretary of War, and President of the 
United States. Taft brought this experience with him as he 
appropriated the role of chief justice and made it his own. It was 
natural for him to regard the administrative duties of die chief 
justiceship as analogous to the executive responsibilities with 
which he was so familiar, especially because there were powerful 
English precedents for this approach to judicial administration. 
Conclusion 
The most lasting effect of Taft's unique perspective was its root 
assumption that the federal judiciary was not a collection of indepen 
dent judges, but instead a unified branch of government with 
functional obligations. No chief justice after Taft has escaped being 
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evaluated on his attention to these obligations. In this regard, Taft did 
indeed transform the office of chief justice. 
But Taft, flush with the enthusiasm of a new idea and filled 
with the contacts and self-assurance of an admired ex-president, 
pushed this perspective to its natural limits. The difficulty he 
encountered, but clearly did not fully conceptualize, was that 
executive administration in the context of a regime of separation 
of powers contains important elements that are essentially politi 
cal, and that therefore stand in tension with American ideals of 
judicial nonpartisanship and to die American institution of 
judicial review. Taft struggled with this tension throughout his 
tenure as chief justice, acting in ways that fell on different sides of 
what today might be regarded as obvious ethical boundaries. 
Taft truly deserves to be known as the father of federal judicial 
management. We can learn from his difficulties, however, how subtle 
and complex is the relationship between the imperatives of judicial 
management and American norms of proper judicial behavior. Chief 
justices after Taft can no longer share his naive Progressive faith in the 
neutrality of disinterested administration. In our own fallen world of 
post-Progressive disillusion, chief justices must somehow negotiate 
between the necessities of functional rationality and the requirements 
of judicial neutrality. If Taft can teach us anything, it is that this 
negotiation will be neither clear nor easy. 
Endnotes 
1. "Taft's Life Praised as Truly American," New York Times, 9 
March 1930, 1. 
2. Felix Frankfurter, "Chief Justices I Have Known," in Felix Frank 
furter on the Supreme Court (Cambridge: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1970), 487-88. 
3. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter, 6 March 1925, in "Half Brother, Half 
Son:,f The Letters of Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter, ed. 
Melvin I. Urofsky and David W. Levy (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1991). 
4. Herbert Little, "The Omnipotent Nine," The American Mercury\5, 
no. 57 (September 1928): 48. 
5. Oliver Wendell Holmes to Sir Frederick Pollock, 2 October 1921, 
in Holmes-Pollock Letters: The Correspondence ofMr. Justice Holmes 
and Sir Frederick Pollock 18744932, ed. Mark DeWolfe Howe 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941), 79. 
6. Holmes to Baroness Charlotte Moncheur, 2 June 1922, Holmes 
Papers, reel 26, frame 761. 
7. Holmes to Pollock, 24 February 1923, Holmes-Pollock Letters, ed. 
Howe, 113-14. 
8. Stone to Thomas Reed Powell, 30 January 1940, Stone Papers. 
9. William Allen White, Masks in a Pageant (New York: 
MacMillan, 1928). 
10. Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis, "The Business ofthe 
Supreme Court of the United States?A Study in the Federal 
Judicial System?Part IV: The Conference of Senior Circuit 
Judges," Harvard Law Review40 (1927): 431, 456. 
11. Ibid., 431, 444. 
12. William Howard Taft, "Adequate Machinery for Judicial Busi 
ness," American Bar Association Journal! (1921): 453-54. 
13. Taft to Charles D. Hillis, 5 February 1923, Taft Papers, reel 250. 
14. "Unification ofthe Judiciary: A Record of Progress," Texas Law 
Review 2 (1924): 445,452-53. 
15. "Rally Support for Daugherty Bill: Bar of Entire Country Asked 
to Lend Assistance in Campaign for Effective Organization of 
United States Judiciary," Journal ofthe American Judicature Society 
5 (1921): 120. 
16. Frankfurter, "Chief Justices I Have Known," 487-88. 
17. "The First Conference," ABAJ9 (1923): 7. 
18. Henry D. Clayton, "Popularizing Administration of Justice," 
ABAJ 8 (1922): 43, 46, quoting Judge Sheppard. 
19. Ibid. 
20. Taft to E. Cockrell, 5 May 1927, Taft Papers, reel 291. 
21. William Howard Taft, "The Attacks on the Courts and Legal 
Procedure," Kentucky Law Journal 5 (1916): 3,16-17. 
22. "Unification of the Judiciary," 445. 
23. William Howard Taft, "The Courts and the Progressive Party," 
Saturday Evening Post 186, no. 39 (20 March 1914): 47. 
24. Taft, "The Attacks on the Courts," 3, 16. 
25. William Howard Taft, "Address ofthe President," American Bar 
Association Report39 (1914): 359,383. 
26. Taft to John A. Peters, 11 October 1927, Taft Papers, reel 295. 
27. Taft to John F. Sater, 27 August 1921, Taft Papers, reel 233. 
28. Taft to Robert Taft, 2 October 1927, Taft Papers, reel 295. 
29. Taft to Frank S. Dietrich, 17 January 1927, Taft Papers, reel 288. 
30. Taft to John S. Partridge, 22 January 1925, Taft Papers, reel 271. 
31. Taftto William B. Gilbert, 15 December 1924, Taft Papers, reel 270. 
32. Leonard Hand to Taft, 1 March 1923, Taft Papers, reel 251. 
33. Taft to Dietrich, 17 January 1927. 
34. Taft to Robert Taft, 2 October 1927. 
35. Report ofthe Fourth Conference of Senior Circuit Judges called 
by the Chief Justice pursuant to the Act of Congress of 14 
September 1922, 38, Taft Papers, reel 618. 
36. Taft to Frank H. Hiscock, 12 April 1922, Taft Papers, reel 241. 
37. Taft to Horace Taft, 30 March 1922, Taft Papers, reel 240. 
38. Taftto Charles M. Hepburn, 10 April 1923, Taft Papers, reel 252. 
39. Taft to Horace Taft, 6 October 1921, Taft Papers, reel 234. 
40. House Committee on the Judiciary, Hearing on H.R. 10479, 67th 
Cong., 2nd Sess., 30 March 1922, 10. 
41. Subcommittee on Appropriations in Charge of Deficiency Appro 
priations, Hearing on the Second Deficiency Appropriations Bill, 
69th Cong., 1st Sess., 13 May 1926, 766. 
42. Ernest Knaebel to Taft, 1 July 1921, Taft Papers, reel 228. 
43. "Taft Awed by Gaining Goal of His Ambition," New York Herald 
(1 July 1921): 2. 
Robert Postis the Alexander F. andMayT. Morrison Professor ofLawatthe 
University of California at Berkeley and is the author o/Constitutional 
Domains: Democracy, Community, Management (1995). 
OAH Magazine of History Fall 1998 29 
